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Deep neural networks are at the forefront of machine learning research. However, despite achieving impres-
sive performance on complex tasks, they can be very sensitive: small perturbations of inputs can be sufficient
to induce incorrect behavior. Such perturbations, called adversarial examples, are intentionally designed to
test the network’s sensitivity to distribution drifts. Given their surprisingly small size, a wide body of liter-
ature conjectures on their existence and how this phenomenon can be mitigated. In this paper we discuss
the impact of adversarial examples on security, safety and robustness of neural networks. We start by intro-
ducing the hypotheses behind their existence, the methods used to construct or protect against them and the
capacity to transfer adversarial examples between different machine learning models. Altogether, the goal is
to provide a comprehensive and self-contained survey of this growing field of research.
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1 INTRODUCTION
There is no doubtMachine Learning (ML) and, in particular, DeepNeural Networks (DNNs) achieve
impressive results on tasks where it is not possible to specify procedural rule-sets. Some examples
are object recognition [72], machine translation [160] or speech recognition [169]. Fueled by the
increasing size of available data and a decrease in computing cost, ML algorithms are explored in a
variety of new tasks and commercial applications, many of which are safety- and mission-critical.
Facing commercial deployment and the possibility of use in safety-critical systems, new prop-
erties of ML algorithms become important: in particular, their ability to maintain performance
whenever faced with data coming from slightly different distributions than trained with or cope
with uncertainties in the operational environment. These properties are defined as the algorithm’s
power to generalize outside the training data and, respectively, the algorithm’s robustness.
In optimization, a robust solution has the ability to perform well under a certain level of un-
certainty [11]. Recent publications [128, 161] showed ML algorithms exhibit low robustness and
triggered an impressive wave of publications. Notably, DNNs are highly sensitive to small, inten-
tional, distribution drifts – inputs which substantially decrease their performance, while being in
close resemblance to training data. The term adversarial examples was first used to describe such
inputs by Szegedy et al. [161].
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Since an intention is required, many publications claim security consequences, e.g. [48, 70, 74, 98,
126, 129, 153, 158], and hypothesize that commercial deployment is hindered by low robustness.
In contrast, other publications show these claims are sometimes exaggerated and demand that
clear security requirements are formulated before security consequences are claimed [21, 58]. In
between, many publications investigate the existence of adversarial examples from a theoretical
perspective and shed light on this particular behavior of ML algorithms. Overall, there are two
emergent reasons to study adversarial examples: (1) because attackers might use them to exploit
ML algorithms and (2) because they show ML algorithms are not robust, which may stop them
from being adopted in some domains.
Another phenomenon presented in this paper is the potential to transfer adversarial examples
between different ML algorithms. This means an input designed to fool DNNs can trigger the
same behavior for kernel methods. From a security standpoint, this phenomenon suggests an at-
tacker does not need precise information about the algorithm she plans to attack. Moreover, from
a learning theory standpoint it suggests that (1) algorithms extrapolate similar decision bound-
aries despite using different ML constructs and (2) sensitivity to similar distribution drifts is an
universal phenomenon, independent of the ML algorithm.
The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive survey of this research field. We character-
ize the phenomenon of adversarial examples from its inception by discussing its causes, position
it in the context of security with relevant threat models, introduce methods to construct and de-
fend against adversarial examples and explore the capacity to transfer them between different ML
algorithms. We strive for completeness, but given the high activity on this topic, with new papers
constantly coming out, there will be further improvements in attacks and defences which are not
covered here. Nonetheless, the most representative attacks and defenses, which reveal how broad
this research field is and how distinct the proposed solutions are, can be found in this paper. The
taxonomies used and the different perspectives on security, safety and robustness discussed in this
paper equip the reader with a broad framework in which new developments will fit. Altogether,
the goal is to provide enough information so this document becomes a self-contained survey of
the field, able to capture its different nuances and inspire new research directions.
Although adversarial examples can be found for a variety of tasks, we restrict our presentation
to object recognition because (1) most publications target this task and (2) examples from this field
are easier to illustrate. Nevertheless, adversarial example are constantly explored in other tasks. Of
particular interest is malware detection [68, 78, 94, 101, 179] because it implies direct consequences
on security. Other tasks such as reinforcement learning [10, 80, 106], speech recognition [23, 27],
facial recognition [150], semantic segmentation [178] or video processing [103, 164, 170] are also
explored. Moreover, some practical experiments are not covered in detail, e.g. deploying adversar-
ial examples in the physical world by printing corrupted images [46, 97], altering the image acqui-
sition device (e.g. a phone camera) [120] or playing adversarial examples through speakers [180].
A general remark about the terminology used in the paper: we make a distinction between ML
algorithms and ML systems, in which the latter is any type of system which uses ML algorithms
and other components. Whenever we talk about security, we consider the entire system under
attack. Moreover, the terms ML algorithms and ML models are used with the same meaning. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on
machine learning, a formal definition of adversarial examples and positions the phenomenon in
its historical context. Section 3 presents taxonomies for attacks and defenses and uses these to
classify existing approaches from the literature. Section 4 discusses the property of robustness
and Section 5 the hypotheses concerning the existence of adversarial examples. Sections 6 and 7
introduce the methods used to generate adversarial examples or protect against them, followed by
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the phenomenon of transferability in Section 8. We conclude with a discussion in Section 9 and
lay down directions for future research in Section 10.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Prerequisites. A computer is said to learn from experience w.r.t. a task and a performance mea-
sure if its measured performance on the task increases with experience [119]. In this paper, we
focus on the task of object recognition: given a set of images defined on the input space X with
their labels from the output space Y, sampled from a fixed, but unknown probability distribution
D over the spaceZ = X ×Y, a ML algorithm attempts to find a mapping f : X → Y which min-
imizes the number of misclassified images. We assume that X is a metric space and we can define
distance functions between two points of the space. The error made by a prediction f (xi ) = yˆi
when the true label isyi is measured by a loss function l : Y×Y → R. Through learning, we select
a function f ∗ from a hypotheses space F such that the expected loss r (f ) = E(x ,y∼D)[l(f (x),y)] is
minimal: f ∗ = argminf ∈F r (f ). In practice, D is not known and only a set of samples S (defined
as a set of pairs {(xi ,yi )}
n
i=1) is available for training. Thus, a ML algorithm uses the empirical loss
to approximate the expected loss:
fˆ = argmin
f ∈F
E(x ,y)∼S[l(f (x),y)]. (1)
The hypotheses space F can be any mapping from X to Y such as a linear function or a DNN.
Choosing F for a task adds an inductive bias from the algorithm designer and involves a tradeoff
between expressivity and generalization: if F is not expressive enough, the algorithm will not be
able to learn complex hypotheses. On the opposite, if F is too expressive, the algorithmwill overfit
on the training data. The loss function is generally chosen to be zero when f (xi ) = yi and positive
otherwise. A common loss function for object recognition is the cross-entropy loss.
The Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) [168] theoretical model for statistical learning guar-
antees that given enough samples for a desired accuracy ϵ and for the probability of getting non-
representative samples from the training distribution δ (0 < ϵ, δ < 1), the empirical risk will have
an error less than or equal to ϵ with probability 1 − δ : P(|r ( fˆ ) − r (f ∗)| ≤ ϵ) ≥ 1 − δ . In this frame-
work, given the choice for ϵ and δ , we can derive the sample complexity for learning a hypothesis
with minimal risk. An important assumption of this model is that training, test and inference data
are drawn from the same probability distributionD. Moreover, all data are sampled independently
from distribution D (also called independent and identically distributed (i.i.d)).
Adversarial Examples. Adversarial examples are inputs intentionally designed to be in close re-
semblance with samples from the distribution D, but cause a misclassification. Formally, given a
classification function f and a clean sample x , which gets correctly classified by f with label y,
an adversarial example x ′ is constructed by applying the minimal perturbation η to input x such
that x ′ gets classified with a different label yˆ: argminη f (x + η) = yˆ. Similarly, in the initial pa-
per on adversarial examples, Szegedy et al. [161] search for the perturbation solving the following
optimization problem:
min
x ′
. ‖x ′ − x ‖p ,
s .t . f (x ′) = yˆ,
(2)
where | | · ‖p is a distance function defined on the metric space X. Searching for the minimal
perturbation is often a complex task because the search space is non-linear and non-convex [100,
129]. However, many approximation solutions have been proposed. Finding solutions to eq. (2) is
illustrated in Figure 1. Some examples of perturbations are also illustrated in Figure 2a.
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Fig. 1. Adversarial example in input and
representation space [145]. While the two
pictures of cars are similar in the image
space, the activation paerns of the sec-
ond car are close to the activation paerns
of the dog. Therefore, the second car gets
classified as a dog. Moving the activation
paerns from cars to dogs while keeping
the representation in the image space simi-
lar is equivalent to searching for a solution
to eq. (2) and generating an adversarial ex-
ample.
The distance function most commonly used for adversarial examples in the object recognition
domain is the p-norm:
‖x ‖p =
(
n∑
i=1
|xi |
p
) 1
p
, (3)
where p ∈ {0, 2,∞}. The choice for p influences the coordinates changed in the initial sample as
follows:
• when p = 0 the distance measures the number of different coordinates between the nor-
mal input and the adversarial; corresponding to the number of pixels altered in the original
image.
• when p = 2 the distance measures the Euclidian distance between the original and the
adversarial image. This metric remains small when there are many small changes to many
pixels and increases when there is a big change in one or multiple pixels.
• when p = ∞ the distance measures the maximum change in any of the coordinates and is
equivalent to the maximum bound for changing each pixel in an image, without restricting
the number of changed pixels.
Although most publications use the p-norm distance, there is an increased interest to move away
from it and explore new metrics. One proposed alternative is the Wasserstein distance, which
represents the cost of moving pixel mass from the original image to the adversarial example [174].
Selecting the right metric is still an open question and will be discussed in Section 9.
Historical considerations. Even though the term adversarial examples was first coined around
2014 in research by Szegedy et al. into DNNs [161], adversarial machine learning was established
long before. Unfortunately, as other authors have also observed [16, 59], recent publications con-
cerning DNNs seem unaware of the earlier research on adversarial machine learning and loose
important perspective in this field. In particular, the importance of thread modeling to security is
overlooked.
The first publication regarding adversarial ML was published in 2004, when Dalvi et al. [34],
followed by Lowd and Meek [110], managed to fool linear classifiers for spam detection by mak-
ing changes to spam e-mails [16]. Barreno et al. [8] first introduced a taxonomy for attacks and
defenses in adversarial settings, and later refined it in [7]. This early taxonomy defines ML threat
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models and is comprehensive enough to include adversarial examples. However, the notion of
minimal perturbation was not yet adopted.
Thereafter, a large body of publications discussed adversarial attacks against ML models at both
training time [15, 143] and test or inference time [61, 110] or defense mechanisms against such
attacks [18, 93]. Adversarial attacks at training time modify or poison the training data set (before
training), while attacks at test time only modify the samples used for inference (after training). In
parallel to developing attacks and defenses, several publications proposed methods to evaluate the
security of ML models against adversarial attacks [7, 14]. Biggio and Roli [16] trace an interesting
parallel between the evolution of adversarial ML and the rise of DNNs.
Adversarial examples represent attacks againstmachine learningmodels at inference time.More-
over, they have a special trait: the perturbations used to fool classifiers are desired to beminimal, or
as small as possible. In practice, such perturbations are very small and barely noticeable to human
observers. In this paper we are concerned with recent literature, triggered by Szegedy et al. [161]
and the widely adopted definition of adversarial examples presented in eq. (2). This body of work
focuses on DNNs and was triggered by the surprisingly small perturbations needed to fool such
algorithms.
From a security standpoint, we can make another distinction between publications before and
after Szegedy et al. [161]: in general, publications before Szegedy et al. look at attacks on systems
providing security functionality (e.g. spam or virus detection), in contrast to more recent papers [16,
131] which look at secure functionality of any application of ML algorithms, i.e. if any application
of ML algorithms is secure. This distinction will be further developed in Section 9.
Related work. Two previous publications surveyed the field of adversarial examples. Firstly, Liu et al. [108]
investigated security threats at both training and test time. Their work, together with [16] repre-
sents a bridge between the two positions mentioned earlier: before and after Szegedy et al. [161]
coined the term adversarial examples. The paper successfully maps the phenomenon of adversar-
ial examples to the initial taxonomy of adversarial attacks [7] and positions the field in the general
context of ML security. Secondly, Akhtar and Mian [2] present an overview of attacks and defenses
against adversarial examples for object recognition, focused on technical details.
We build on previous work by relating the threats posed by adversarial examples to security,
safety and robustness of DNNs. Moreover, we discuss the hypotheses on the existence of adversar-
ial examples and their property of being transferable between different ML models.
3 THREAT MODEL AND TAXONOMIES OF ATTACKS AND DEFENSES
For any meaningful discussion of security it is crucial to have a clear description of a threat model,
aka an attacker model, which describes the goals of attacker – i.e. what does the attacker want to
achieve – along with a description of the attacker’s capabilities and knowledge – i.e. what means
does the attacker have to make that happen.
Adversarial examples are only one possible attack vector on ML systems. Instead of targeting a
system at inference time by feeding it an adversarial example, an attacker could also try to compro-
mise the system in the training phase. This obviously requires different capabilities of the attacker,
namely the ability to influence or compromise the training set. Attackersmay have other objectives
than attacking the correct functioning of a system. For example, an attacker might be interested
in obtaining information about the model and reverse engineering some of its parameters – which
is an attack on confidentiality rather than integrity.
This paper only consider attacks at inference time, i.e. attackswith adversarial examples. Amore
general threat model, which also considers attacks on the learning phase, was proposed in [7]. A
more recent and comprehensive threat model is given by Papernot et al. [131]. We introduce a new
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way to classify attacks and defenses not considered in these earlier publications: in sections 3.1
and 3.2 we introduce a notion of strategy to classify different techniques to generate adversarial
examples or protect against them, providing a taxonomy we use to classify existing research.
Whether or not a threat model is a good threat model for a specific system – i.e. whether it is
realistic, relevant, and complete – is a separate issue: a threat model defines a hypothetical attacker
whichmay not have any bearing on attackers out there in the real world. Threat modeling depends
on the specific application and its context: these have to be known to do a good risk analysis, which
should also consider impacts, efforts, and possibilities to recover from attacks. This topic will be
further discussed in Section 9.
3.1 Taxonomy of adversarial aacks.
The basic threat model outlined above can be refined in different ways, depending on the attacker’s
goal or the attacker’s knowledge, as discussed below.
Attacker Goal. The basic goal of causing misclassifications can be further refined in:
• Untargeted attacks, where it is the attacker’s goal to produce an input that will be misclassi-
fied as any incorrect class, and
• Targeted attacks, where the input is incorrectly classified as a specific incorrect class.
This distinction is also called error specificity in [16]. Targeted attacks are also called source-
targeted attacks in [130].
The distinction above considers the outputs of the ML algorithm that the attacker is interested
in. An orthogonal distinction can be made by considering inputs the attacker is interested in: the
attacker’s goal may be to simply misclassify any input, but it may also be to misclassify a specific
input, or an input from a specific set (for example, those inputs that should be classified as some
specific class). This distinction is also called attack specificity [16]. In most cases, adversarial ex-
amples search for perturbations specific to one input drawn from the data generation distribution.
Therefore, we do not consider the attack specificity in this paper.
Attacker Knowledge. When it comes to the attacker’s knowledge, a common distinction is be-
tween a white box scenario, where the attacker has complete knowledge of the model, its param-
eters, and can completely replicate the model under attack, and a black box scenario, where the
attacker has no knowledge of the model and only has access to query the system [130, 131]. Note
that the system here also encompasses any preprocessing of raw inputs before these are fed to the
ML algorithm. For the black box scenario, one can then still make different assumptions about the
attacker’s ability to query the model indefinitely or only a limited numer of, to access the output
probability distribution or the final class, etc.
Biggio and Roli [16] also consider the gray-box scenario, in which an attacker has only partial
knowledge about the model. However, this scenario is not common in the adversarial examples
literature and it is often seen as a special case of the black box scenario, in which the attacker has
some restrictions (as suggested earlier) [21].
Attack Strategies. We use the notion of attack strategy to classify ways to construct adversarial
examples. This involves two aspects: (1) what types of perturbations can an attacker use? and (2)
which classes of algorithms are then used to find interesting perturbations? Regarding the first
question, we distinguish between perturbations based on noise and perturbations based on geo-
metric transformations. Methods in the first class involve adding white noise to specific areas of an
image, while methods from the second class use natural geometric transformations – e.g. rotations
or translations – to induce misclassifications. These two perturbation types have been used until
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Attack
Attacker Goal Attacker Knowledge Attack Strategy Attack Performance
Untargeted Targeted White Box Black Box
Noise Geometric
Strength Complexity
Experimental
Setup
Research
Impact
Optimization
Sensitivity
Analysis
Generative Optimization
L-BFGS [161] - x x - x - - - *** *** *** ***
Deep Fool [123] x - x - x - - - * *** *** ***
UAP [120] x - x - x - - - *** ** *** **
Carlini [26] x x x - x - - - *** *** *** ***
FGS [65] x - x - - x - - * * ** ***
JSMA [130] x x x - - x - - * *** ** ***
STA [79] - x x - - x - - ** *** * *
SV-UAP [91] - x x - - x - - * *** ** *
RSSA [165] x - x - - x - - * * *** ***
BPDA [4] - x x - - x - - *** *** *** ***
Elastic-Net [29] - x x - - x - - *** *** ** **
BI [97] x - x - - x - - ** ** *** ***
ILC [97] - x x - - x - - ** ** *** ***
Madry [115] x - x - - x - - *** ** *** ***
Momentum [39] x - x - - x - - ** ** *** **
ATN [6] x x x - - - x - ** *** ** *
NAE [186] - x x - - - x - ** *** ** *
Univ. GM [135] - x x - - - x - ** *** *** *
Unrestr. GM [155] - x x - - - x - *** *** *** *
ManiFool [89] x x x - - - - x ** *** ** *
Spatial Tr. [176] - x x - - - - x *** ** ** *
Expectation [5] - x x - - - - x ** ** ** ***
Formal Tr. [133] - x x - - - - x *** ** *** *
Rotation Tr. [45] x - x x - - - x ** * ** *
Grad. Est. [13] x x - x x - - - *** ** ** *
ZOO [30] x x - x x - - - *** *** ** *
IS [124] x x - x x - - - * * ** *
Substitute [129] - x - x - x - - ** *** *** ***
Table 1. Catalog of adversarial aacks following the taxonomy introduced in Section 3.1 and the quality
aributes defined in Section 6.
now, but others may well exist. Searching for new perturbation types is an active research area
and will be later discussed in Section 9 and Section 10.
Regarding the second question, we distinguish between three classes of algorithms:
• Optimization. Here attackers use optimization algorithms to search for solutions to eq. (2),
alternative forms or constraints.
• Sensitivity Analysis. Here attackers use sensitivity analysis – a class of algorithms used to
determine the contribution of each input feature to the output – in order to find sensitive
features and perturb them.
• Generative. Here the probability distribution of adversarial perturbations is learned using
generative models and used to sample new adversarial examples.
Classification of Attacks. Table 1 classifies representative attacks using the taxonomy outlined
above and some quality attributes that will be discussed later, in Section 6. Note that untargeted and
targeted attacks are approximately equally distributed, suggesting both goals have been explored
in depth. There is clearly more research on white box attacks than black box attacks, and more
attacks use noise perturbations than geometric transformations. Maybe it is not so surprising that
research has concentrated on white box attacks: here there is more information, and hence more
opportunities to explore how to use this. But note that in many attack scenarios it is more realistic
that the attacker does not have full knowledge of the system under attack; for these, research into
black box attacks is much more relevant.
Zooming in to noise based perturbations, we observe that most attacks make use of sensitiv-
ity analysis. There may be several reasons for it. Firstly, these attacks are, in general, faster than
optimization based attacks. Therefore, they are better suited to be incorporated in the training pro-
cess of ML models and used to improve their robustness. They are also simpler than optimization
based attacks, which rely on different constructs – e.g. L-BFGS – than commonly used in training
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or analyzing neural networks – e.g. gradient descent or the Jacobian matrix. Secondly, generative
attacks have generally received less attention in literature.
Although attacks based on sensitivity analysis are more common, these require full knowledge
of the system under attack. Even the black box approach of Papernot et al. [129], called ‘substitute’
in Table 1, an attacker trains a white box model and uses it to create adversarial examples, which
are then transferred to a black box model. In contrast to sensitivity-based methods, optimization-
based attacks are used more in black box scenarios. This result is not unexpected: without white
box access to an algorithm it is hard to perform sensitivity analysis. However, an optimizer can
still minimize an objective by sending queries to a black box algorithm and use various constraints
to reflect the operational environment – e.g. limited number of queries.
We observe that no attacks based on generative methods are used in black box settings. Recall
that generative models involve learning the probability distribution of adversarial perturbations.
Without access to any data, learning the underlying probability distribution is difficult. As in the
substitute approach of Papernot et al., one can train a substitute generative model and try to trans-
fer the examples to other algorithms. However, this scenario has not yet been explored.
Regarding attacks based on geometric transformations, we observe that these only use optimiza-
tion methods and are usually applied in white box scenarios. The reason for making extensive use
of optimization methods is the constraint on the perturbation size: these attacks search for a very
small perturbation which should not alter the overall geometry of the scene. We can imagine that
rotating an image of the digit six by 180 degrees will generate a misclassification. Maybe similar
scenarios can be found for images with objects, however, the goal now is to find a very small
perturbation which does not change the scene. This goal can be more easily formulated as an
optimization problem and solved by an optimizer.
3.2 Taxonomy of Defenses
A defender can be reactive and improve the system in response to new attacks as these are dis-
covered or proactive and try to anticipate attacks and design the system with security in mind. A
disadvantage of reactive security is that it can only protect against known attacks. This distinction
has been used for ML security [15, 108]. However, the field of adversarial examples mainly focused
on defenses against perturbations in the p-norm ball around one input. Since this threat is already
known, one can argue that most literature focuses on reactive defenses. A scalable and flexible
solution to this threat has not yet been found, so this line of research is still ongoing. Therefore,
we classify defenses only in terms of the defense strategy, a notion introduced below, which is
similar to notion of the attack strategy from Section 3.1. This classification is meant to give an
overview of the large volume and highly varied work that has been done on this topic. It is worth
mentioning that protecting against perturbations in the p-norm ball is not the only requirement
to guarantee security, as argued in a series of publications [21, 58, 127]. This issue is discussed in
Section 9. Moreover, most defenses proposed lead to a false sense of security because they assume
an attacker does not know a defense is employed. This threat is discussed in Section 7.4.
Defense Strategies. Similar to the attack strategies, defense strategies describe the types of algo-
rithms used to defend against adversarial examples. We start by classifying defenses based on their
place in the processing pipeline. Some defenses act early in the pipeline, before an input reaches
the model, while others strengthen the model directly (and are part of it). We call the first class
of defenses guards because they do not interact with the under attack and only build precautions
around it. The second class of defenses acts directly on the model, by modifying its architecture,
the training data or the loss function. Therefore, we call them defenses by design.
We decompose these two classes further based on the types of algorithms used:
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• Guards:
– Detection. These methods assume that adversarial examples have special characteristics or
are sampled from different data distributions than normal inputs. Therefore, we can train
a separate detector to identify and discard them.
– Input Transformation. Defenses in this class use pre-processing techniques such as com-
pression or bit-depth reduction in order to remove the effect of adversarial perturbations
and diminish their impact on the system under attack.
• Defense by Design:
– Adversarial Training. Given that learning is a data driven process, a normal defense strat-
egy is to include adversarial examples in the training process.
– Architectural Defenses. Another strategy is to design new architectures and models with
constraints related to adversarial examples, such as custom regularization techniques.
– Certified Defenses. An interesting approach to defend against adversarial examples is to
use formal verification to certify that within some bounds no adversarial examples exist.
Classification of Defenses. Table 2 classifies representative defenses using the taxonomy outlined
above and the quality attributes discussed later, in Section 7.
Note that all strategies are well represented, which means they all showed some potential to de-
fend against adversarial examples and are worth looking into. Guards are of interest because they
do not impose any restrictions on the ML algorithm we want to defend. In particular, adversarial
detectors exploit perturbation specific characteristics in an attempt to detect adversarial examples
and discard them. These techniques are suited for scenarios in which we can discard or choose
not to classify an input. However, the perturbations produced by different attacks are sometimes
different and require retraining the detector. Moreover, adversarial detectors which rely on ML
constructs can also suffer from low robustness and can be attacked with adversarial examples. In-
put transformations aim to reduce the space where adversarial perturbations lie and diminish their
impact. These are lightweight techniques, – e.g. image compression – easy to apply and require
low computational resources. Such properties are important for a defense because they make it
easy to implement and adopt. Unfortunately, as we will discuss in Section 7.1, guards are not very
effective.
Defenses by design require retraining the models adding custom changes to the training data
or its architecture. Therefore, they require more resources than guards. Since ML is a data driven
process, a normal reaction to adversarial examples is to include them in the training set. This
method, called adversarial training, is a regularization technique used for robustness and shows
good results when the space of the perturbations can be well approximated. Moreover, adversarial
training provides benefits for the model, such as more interpretable gradients [167].
In an analogousmanner, architectural defenses rely on regularization penalties designed to offer
robustness against adversarial examples. This time, however, the constraints are applied layer-wise,
to the input data or to the final layer. These constraints go beyond enhancing the training data set
with adversarial examples and require new architectural designs or constraints.
The strategies presented above can only give approximate (often empirical) guarantees about
their efficacy against adversarial examples. In contrast, certified defenses borrow methods from
formal verification to certify that adversarial examples can not be found within some bounds.
These defenses have great potential for improving ML models and finding spots where they fail.
However, they are not yet scalable to deep models and often require more computational resources
than other defenses. More details about each defense strategy follow in Section 7.
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Defense Defense Strategy
Defense Performance
Defense Strength Defense Complexity Experimental Setup Research Impact
Statistical Detection [67] Guard - Adversarial Detector * ** ** **
Binary Classification [62] Guard - Adversarial Detector * ** * *
In-Layer Detection [117] Guard - Adversarial Detector * ** *** **
Detecting from Artifacts [52] Guard - Adversarial Detector * ** ** **
SafetyNet [111] Guard - Adversarial Detector * ** ** *
Convolutional Statistics Detector [104] Guard - Adversarial Detector * ** ** *
Saliency Data Detector [183] Guard - Adversarial Detector * ** * *
Ensemble Detectors [1] Guard - Adversarial Detector * ** * *
MagNet [116] Guard - Adversarial Detector * ** *** **
Generative Detector [102] Guard - Adversarial Detector * ** * *
PixelDefend [154] Guard - Adversarial Detector * ** *** *
VAE Detector [57] Guard - Adversarial Detector * *** ** *
Bit-Depth [70] Guard - Input Transformation * * ** **
Basis Transformations [148] Guard - Input Transformation * * ** *
Randomized Transformations [177] Guard - Input Transformation * * *** *
Thermometer Encoding [20] Guard - Input Transformation * * *** *
Blind Pre-Processing [136] Guard - Input Transformation * * * *
Data Discretization [28] Guard - Input Transformation * * ** *
Adaptive Noise [105] Guard - Input Transformation * * * *
FGSM Training [65] Design – Adversarial Training * * ** ***
Gradient Training [152] Design – Adversarial Training * * * *
Gradient Regularization [114] Design – Adversarial Training * * * *
Structured Regularization [139] Design – Adversarial Training * * ** *
Robust Training [149] Design – Adversarial Training ** * ** **
Strong Adversary Training [79] Design – Adversarial Training * ** * **
Madry [115] Design – Adversarial Training *** ** *** ***
Ensemble Training [165] Design – Adversarial Training ** ** ** ***
Stochastic Pruning [38] Design – Adversarial Training ** ** ** **
Distillation [132] Design – Architecture * ** ** ***
Parseval Networks [31] Design – Architecture * ** ** **
Deep Contractive Networks [69] Design – Architecture * *** ** **
Biological Networks [125] Design – Architecture * * *** *
DeepCloak [55] Design – Architecture * * * *
Fortified Networks [99] Design – Architecture ** ** ** *
Rotation-Equivariant Networks [40] Design – Architecture * * * *
HyperNetworks [159] Design – Architecture * *** * *
Bidirectional Networks [134] Design – Architecture * ** * *
DAM [96] Design – Architecture ** ** ** *
Safety Verification [82] Design – Certified *** *** *** **
Reluplex [90] Design – Certified *** *** *** ***
Planet [43] Design – Certified ** *** * *
Convex polytope [173] Design – Certified ** *** ** *
Dual [41] Design – Certified *** *** *** *
Abstract Interpretation [118] Design – Certified *** *** *** *
Interval Bound [66] Design – Certified *** ** *** *
Table 2. Catalog of defenses against adversarial examples following the taxonomy introduced in Section 3.2
and the quality aributes from Section 7.
4 ROBUSTNESS
Most publications use the property of robustness as a proxy to safety or security. Whether this is a
relevant aspect for safety or security is left for the discussion in Section 9. For now, we introduce
robustness and discuss several methods used to measure it.
Two general definitions of robustness are valid for adversarial examples: (1) distributional robust-
ness, defined as insensitivity to slight deviations of the underlying distribution from the assumed
model [83] and (2) optimization robustness, defined as an algorithm’s ability to perform well un-
der a certain level of uncertainty in the input space [11]. This means the uncertainty margins are
defined beforehand. In real world applications of optimization, small uncertainty in the data can
heavily affect the quality of the output, therefore, instead of deploying uncertain solutions it is
recommended to deploy the associated robust counterpart [11].
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Formally, given a class of distributions P around the data generation distribution D ∼ Pi ,
distributional robustness is defined as:
E(x ,y)∼Pi [l(f (x),y)] ≃ E(x ,y)∼D[l(f (x),y)].
The choice of P can influence the robustness guarantee and the ability to compute it. For example,
one can choose a family of distributions defined on a convex metric space around the empirical
distribution, measured using a metric on this space (e.g. relative entropy). The robust counterpart
of this problem can be formulated as fˆ = argminf ∈F E(x ,y)∼P[max l(f (x),y)], which is similar to
eq. (1), but the minimization is performed on the maximum loss given training data sampled from
the class of distributions we want to provide robustness for. In the case of adversarial examples,
the samples from Pi account for input data in close resembles with data sampled from D, but
perturbed with perturbations equivalent to solving eq. (2).
Optimization robustness aims to protect against a strict set of perturbations around an input x ,
defined using a distance function d(·) on the input space X:
U = {x ′|d(x ,x ′) ≤ ϵ}, (4)
where ϵ controls the set size. Similar to distributional robustness, the robust counterpart is defined
as:
fˆ = argmin
f ∈F
E(x ,y)∼S[max
x ′∈U
l(f (x ′,y)], (5)
where x ′ is a realization of x in the uncertainty set described by d(·). The metric d(·) and the
size of ϵ from eq. (4) control the size and the direction of the perturbation, and should account
for perturbation equivalent to solving eq. (2). Minimizing on solutions (or approximations) of the
inner maximization problem in eq. (5) increases the robustness of models against perturbations
fromU. In fact, solutions to eq. (5) result in state-of-the-art defenses, as will be discussed later, in
Section 7. A discussion about d(·) was already provided in Section 2.
Judging adversarial examples through these lenses, we observe that (1) according to some pub-
lications (guards-detectors) adversarial examples violate the i.i.d assumption and belong to a class
of distributions P dissimilar to D, for which DNNs do not provide distributional robustness in
standard training settings and (2) in order to build robust models, the uncertainty bounds have
to be defined up-front s.t. the training procedure is adjusted for robustness. In this context, it is
important to decide if one wants to guarantee performance for inputs drawn from a different dis-
tribution or only within some known bounds. The problem is context dependent and a scalable,
universal, solution is missing for the moment.
Practical robust counterparts for linear models or Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [156] rely
on adding penalty terms to the loss function and have been used to protect against adversarial
examples [37, 144]. However, for tasks where complex and highly non-linear models are used –
such as object recognition – finding a robust counterpart is often complex or intractable [79]. The
natural question that rises is how to measure, quantify and test robustness of these models. The
solutions presented in this paper rely on finding lower or upper bounds to it, as follows:
• Lower bound. The minimum space around an input (defined by a distance function) where
no adversarial examples can be found:U s.t. ∀x ′ ∈ U, f (x ′) = y.
• Upper bound. The maximum size of a perturbation for which no adversarial examples can be
constructed: ϵ s.t. ‖x − x ′‖ ≤ ϵ, f (x ′) = y.
Biggio and Roli [16] proposed to also measure the model’s accuracy while increasing the attack
strength. This method is recommended to evaluate the security of an algorithm and shows when
it starts to misbehave or ’break’. In this paper we focus on evaluating robustness using the two
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bounds presented above because all publications discussed use any of them. Nonetheless, the
method proposed by Biggio and Roli [16] is better suited for evaluating security and can be used
to approximate an upper bound to robustness.
Several definitions and methods to measure robustness have been proposed in the literature
and are discussed below. In the adversarial examples inception paper, Szegedy et al. [161] measure
robustness using spectral analysis of each layer. Under the assumption that all layers are Lipschitz
continuous, one can inspect the upper Lipschitz constant for each layer. It follows that a lower
bound stability measure can be derived for a DNN by multiplying the Lipschitz upper bounds of
each layer. However, this global Lipschitz constant often gives a very loose bound [171].
Fawzi et al. [50] propose to average over the minimal perturbations required to cause a misclas-
sification, for each example in the data set: ρ(f ,x) = Ef (x )∼S[‖η‖p ], and provide a theoretical
upper bound guarantee for linear and quadratic classifiers. However, this approximate boundary
can also be affected by distribution drifts.
Bastani et al. [9] provide a formalism for lower bound robustness to adversarial examples, inde-
pendent of the Lipschitz constant. The authors abstract from robustness of a point, defined locally
as ρ(f ,x) = inf{α ≥ 0 | ‖x ′ − x ‖p ≤ α ,f (x
′) , f (x)}, the notion of adversarial frequency:
ϕ(f , ϵ) = Px∼D[ρ(f ,x) ≤ ϵ] i.e. the probability mass function of a point not being robust. The
authors also define a metric called adversarial severity, as the average minimal space where f
fails to be robust, conditioned by the upper bound ϵ : µ(f , ϵ) = Ef (x )∼pdata [ρ(f ,x) | ρ(f ,x) ≤ ϵ].
However, the generalization of point-wise robustness still involves an upper bound on the pertur-
bation. Weng et al. [171] developed a lower bound metric for robustness based on Lipschitz conti-
nuity. CLEVER [171] generalizes a metric introduced by Hein and Andriushchenko [74] for kernel
methods and neural networks with only one layer. Consider f (x)with continuously differentiable
components fi and define the class which f predicts for an input x0 as y = argmax1≤i≤K fi (x0),
then the lower bound robustness of f is defined as: βL = miny′,y
fy (x0)−fy′ (x0)
L
y′
q
,where L
y′
q is the Lip-
schitz constant for the function fy (x)− fy′(x) in p-norm. Weng et al. propose to use extreme value
theory in order to approximate βL . However, Goodfellow [63] showed that CLEVER fails to cor-
rectly estimate lower bound robustness, even in theoretical settings. Moreover, Huster et al. [84]
showed that the existing approaches to compute the Lipschitz constant of DNNs have representa-
tional learning limitations, which may limit the robustness guarantees we can obtain using it.
The question of accurately measuring robustness remains open. Some publications, presented
in Section 7.2, exhaustively search for the space constrained by a lower bound or provide convex
relaxations in order to accurately approximate it [146]. In practice, however, a large body of lit-
erature uses the expected accuracy of a model tested with upper bounded adversarial examples
and ignore the dichotomy between lower and upper bounds. In these cases, the upper bounds are
chosen arbitrary and often lead to incorrect evaluations. Salman et al. [146] investigated the gap
between upper and lower bounds computed using exact solvers and showed it can grow up to 5
orders of magnitude.
5 HYPOTHESES ON THE EXISTENCE OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Since the discovery of adversarial examples, there is no universally accepted hypothesis on their
existence. Many conjectures have been proposed and are discussed in this section. The presenta-
tion follows a chronological order, but new developments or evidence for a conjecture are added
in line with the initial publication which advanced it.
Initial hypothesis – low-probability spaces. At first, adversarial examples were thought to lie in
low-probability spaces from the data manifold, which are hard to reach by randomly sampling the
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space around an input [161]. Searching for solutions to eq. (2), however, spans the input space in
search for adversarial examples and enables the solver to find perturbations. While state-of-the-
art DNNs models are already trained with data augmentation techniques in order to increase their
robustness, the transformed inputs are highly correlated and drawn from the same distribution.
Adversarial examples were thought to be neither correlated or identically distributed, thus leading
to the theory that they lie in ’pockets’ of the data manifold [161].
Gu and Rigazio [69] investigated the size of these pockets and discovered they are relatively
large in volume and locally continuous. The authors hypothesized that sensitivity to adversarial
examples relates to choosing a wrong objective function or to deficiencies of the training method –
instead of being a consequence of the model’s topology. Therefore, coming up with a training
procedure that can efficiently output regions where the data variance around a training input is
low should solve this issue. The authors made an attempt to design a defense which minimizes the
network’s output variance, with some success for small perturbations and small data sets. However,
this was not enough to train robust models for larger data sets or any perturbation.
The linearity hypothesis. Goodfellow et al. [65] refuted the hypothesis that adversarial examples
lie in small regions of the data manifold and advanced the conjecture that adversarial examples
span large and high-dimensional regions. The authors argued adversarial examples exist because
DNNs have, in fact, very linear behavior, despite non-linear transformations within hidden layers.
The choice for activation functions that are easy to optimize (e.g. ReLU) drive DNNs to behave
more linearly. Therefore, summing small perturbations in all dimensions of a high dimensional
input forces the entire sum in a direction that will likely cause a misclassification. This hypothesis
lead to the discovery of more efficient methods to generate adversarial examples, as discussed in
Section 6.1.1. Empirical evidence for the linearity hypothesis was also provided by [96, 162, 166].
Luo et al. [113] proposed a variant of this conjecture in which DNNs operate linearly in certain
regions of the input manifold, but non-linear in others.
Vanishing gradients. Rozsa et al. [141] believe that the gradients of correctly classified inputs
diminish during training and fail to create flat regions around the training data. Therefore, most
training data lie close to a decision boundary and small perturbations are able to push inputs over
the boundary. The authors hypothesise that coming up with a training algorithm that will avoid
this phenomenon will mitigate the threat to adversarial examples. However, as we will discuss in
Section 7.4, imposing constraints on the gradients is not an efficient defense.
The boundary tilting hypothesis. Tanay and Griffin challenge the linear hypothesis as not "con-
vincing" [163]. At first, because small perturbations are taken relatively to the activations, which
increase linearly to the problem. Therefore, the ratio between inputs and perturbations remains
constant. Secondly, the authors argue that linear behavior is not sufficient to explain the adversarial
examples phenomenon and demonstrate the possibility to build linear models that are not sensitive
to adversarial examples. In contrast, the authors propose the boundary tilting perspective, based on
the assumption that a learned class boundary lies close to the data manifold, but the boundary is
tilted with respect to it. Adversarial examples can then be found by perturbing points from the
data manifold towards the classification boundary until the perturbed input crosses the bound-
ary. If the boundary is only slightly tilted, the distance required by the perturbation to cross the
decision-boundary is very small, leading to strong adversarial examples that are visually almost
imperceptibly close to the data. The authors argue that adversarial examples are likely to occur
along directions of low variance in the data and thus speculate that adversarial examples can be
considered an effect of an overfitting phenomenon, which can be alleviated through regularization.
Izmailov et al. [87] investigated this claim by removing low-variability features from inputs during
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classification and found out that removing them barely improves robustness. However, removing
the features with lowmutual information has a significant impact on robustness. On a similar note,
Ilyas et al. [86] showed that adversarial examples are a consequence of non-robust features, which
are derived from patterns in the data that can be easy to predict by computers, but not understood
by humans.
Relation to decision boundaries. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [121] showed that it is possible to gener-
ate universal perturbations – which can be applied to any input. While investigating the phenom-
enon, the authors hypothesized that adversarial examples exploit geometric correlations in the
space between decision boundaries. Precisely, the authors suggest the existence of a low dimen-
sional sub-space which contains the vectors normal to the decision boundaries around an input.
Fawzi et al. [51] examined the sensitivity to adversarial examples in relation to the curvature of
decision boundaries. Their results show that a small curvature in the decision boundary increases
the classifier’s robustness to adversarial examples. Thus, it is assumed that limiting the curvature
of decision boundaries can increase sensitivity to adversarial examples A similar hypothesis was
proposed in [165] and more theoretical analyses are presented in [122].
Not i.i.d hypothesis. A different hypothesis assumes that adversarial examples lie off the data
manifold, and are sampled from a different distribution [57, 102, 116, 154]. This hypothesis lead
to the proposal of adversarial detection methods (Section 7.1) and the attempt to learn this new
distribution with generative models. While interesting in nature, because the proof of this hy-
pothesis means adversarial examples break the i.i.d assumption, more empirical data is needed.
Carlini and Wagner [24] also questioned this hypothesis by developing attacks that can easily by-
pass adversarial detectors.
The manifold geometry hypothesis. Gilmer et al. [59] hypothesize that adversarial examples are a
result of the high-dimensional (and possibly intricate) geometry of the data manifold. The authors
used a synthetic data set which is easier to explore and found that whenever the classifier has
the slightest test error, most data points in the input distribution which get correctly classified
lie in the neighborhood of a misclassified input. Therefore, whenever training is performed on an
approximation of the real distribution, the model is sensitive to adversarial examples. This result
raises the question if the sensitivity to adversarial examples could ever be removed. Moreover, the
authors refute the hypothesis that adversarial examples lie off the data manifold.
Relation to training resources. Following the PAC-learning model briefly discussed in Section 2,
Schmidt et al. [147] showed the sample complexity for training robust models learning can be
significantly higher than for training non-robust models. In particular, for achieving robustness
for the l∞ norm requires an increase of sample complexity polynomial in the input dimension. On a
similar note, Bubeck et al. [19] suggest that robust learning in the statistical query model increases
the number of queries exponentially. Somehow dissimilar, Cullina et al. [33], show that the sample
complexity does not increase in the presence of adversaries bounded by convex constraint sets.
This result suggests that robustness can be achieved under some constraints, yet the practicality
of such sets was not evaluated. Tsipras et al. [167] show that gaining robustness involves loosing
accuracy and that this tradeoff prevails independent of the ML model.
In summary, although Tanay and Griffin [163] claim to refute the linearity hypothesis, there is
still not enough empirical evidence to completely reject it. One can argue that linear transforma-
tions in high dimensional spaces can be sufficient to move a sample in the direction of a tilting
boundary, thus causing a misclassification. However, the authors succeed to show that adversarial
examples are not only due to linear behavior of DNNs. The complicated geometry of the manifold
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can be a root cause of adversarial examples, as suggested by Gilmer et al. [59]. However, there is
still no study to investigate if the probability of finding adversarial examples is constrained by the
geometry of the manifold. On a similar note, there is no study to connect non-robust features to
the geometry of the manifold. Will removing non-robust features, as suggested by [86], lead to
a smooth manifold on which the data is better represented? Further on, there is no evidence to
show that adversarial examples lie off the data manifold. The publications using this claim tried
to develop adversarial detectors with some degree of success, however, their efficacy is still low.
It is not yet settled if adversarial examples lie in small or large spaces in the decision space.
According to Gilmer et al. [59] they are proportional with the testing error and the capacity of
a model to correctly approximate the input distribution. However, more evidence is needed to
support this conjecture for models with high capacity.
Some publications suggest there are limits to adversarial robustness [19, 49, 59] and even that
sensitivity to adversarial examples can not be removed [59]. Such a consequence sparks several
questions regarding future research in this field, some of which are discussed in Section 10. We
argue that more fundamental research, similar to [33, 59, 86, 147], is needed in order to explain both
the causes and the effects of this particular behavior of DNNs and develop the topic in Section 9.
6 ATTACKS
Besides the attacker model introduced in Section 3, we characterize the performance of every at-
tack in a qualitative and a quantitative manner. Qualitatively, we evaluate the attack’s performance
against different ML models and defenses, while quantitatively, we evaluate the attack’s impact in
the literature. Each dimension for both the qualitative and the quantitative assessment is measured
on a categorical scale, ranging from low(*), medium(**) and high(***). The final score is computed
by averaging over the attributes described below.
We select three dimensions for the qualitative evaluation:
• Attack strength. The attack strength evaluates how powerful an attack is against various
ML models and defenses. It is based on the lower and upper bounds discussed in Section 4
(*, ** or ***, depending on the bound size and the fooling rate). We also consider untargeted
attacks (*), less powerful than targeted ones (***). Moreover, some attacks can be used to find
universal perturbations (***) – which can be used with any testing sample – while others
can only discover specific perturbations specific to one sample (* or **, depending on the
perturbation size). Further on, some attacks have been successfully tested against a large
array of defenses (** or ***, depending on the defense types), while others not (*). The attack
strength hides an inherent trade-off with the attack’s complexity.
• Attack complexity. The complexity of an attack evaluates the resources needed to mount it,
but also the underlying assumptions of the technique used. Some attacks use simpler, single-
shot, methods to generate the perturbation (*), while others use more complex, iterative
methods (** or ***, depending on the number of steps needed and the method used).
• Experimental setup. The experimental setup evaluates how thorough the attack was tested,
onwhich data sets (* forMNIST or similar, ** for CIFAR-100 or similar and *** for ImageNet or
similar) and which models were used during evaluation (* for simple, feed forward models,
** for deep feed forward or convolutional models and *** for deep convolutional models).
Moreover, the experimental setup evaluates if the attack has been tested in practice (** or
***, depending on the use case presented) or not (*).
The quantitative evaluation is based on bibliometrics indicators, namely the ratio between the
number of citations and the number of months since publication as indicated by Google Scholar.
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Although bibliometrics are not a direct indicator of quality, in this paper they are used to explore
the areas where research concentrates most and which papers have potential for a novice reader.
The results are presented along the threat modeling introduced in Section 3.1 in Table 1. Note
that except attacks based on geometric transformations, which have lower complexity for high
strength, most strong attacks are also complex. In particular, optimization based attacks are, on
average, both strong and complex. The distribution is different for sensitivity based attacks, where
we can find complex attacks with minimum strength and strong attacks with medium complex-
ity (e.g. Madry). Training generative models is also more complex because, as we will discuss in
the next section, they require to train a generator and a discriminator, but also to perform extra
operations. Nonetheless, generative models have medium to high strength. More details follow in
the next section where the attacks are presented based on the attacker knowledge and the attack
strategies introduced earlier.
6.1 White box aacks
In the white box scenario, an attacker has complete knowledge about the model under attack,
its parameters and the data used for training or testing. Therefore, an attacker can completely
replicate themodel or learn the data generation distribution, such that it can generate new samples.
6.1.1 Noise based aacks. We begin with attacks which craft perturbations from white noise
because they are more common. The presentation follows the attack strategies discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1. An illustration of noise perturbations is shown in Figure 2.
(a) Adversarial examples [161]. (b) Universal Adversarial Perturbation [120].
Fig. 2. An illustration of adversarial examples. (a) Specific perturbations for each new input. The images in
the first column are inputs correctly classified, the ones in the middle are the perturbations used to induce
a misclassification and the images on the last column (right) are the resulting adversarial examples. (b) Uni-
versal perturbations – only one perturbation can be applied to any picture on the le to generate adversarial
examples on the right.
Optimization Attacks. All attacks rely on optimization constructs. For example, in order to dis-
cover sensitive features, one can use the gradient taken w.r.t. one input. However, in this section
we review the attacks that use optimization methods in order to search for solutions to eq. (2) or
alternative forms and constraints.
Szegedy et al. [161] were the firsts to discover the DNNs sensitivity to adversarial examples and
coin the term adversarial examples. The authors used limited memory box constrained optimiza-
tion (L-BFGS) in order to approximate the minimum perturbation needed to change the label of an
input, as in eq. (2). The initial experimental results showed that the minimum average distortion
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is very low, and can not be distinguished by human observers. This publication was the first to
discover this behavior of DNNs and triggered a large array of publications.
Carlini and Wagner [26] proposed an alternative form to eq. (2) in which the classification func-
tion is replaced due to its non-linear character. The alternative function is chosen s.t. f (x +η) = yˆ
if and only if f (x +η) ≤ 0 (this is a linear constraint). This formulation allows the use of powerful
optimization methods in order to search for very small perturbations and remains, at the time of
writing this paper, one of the state-of-the-art attacks. Given its popularity, we will refer to this
attack as the Carlini and Wagner attack.
The DeepFool attack [123] assumes DNNs behave linear around an input and projects the point
to a separation plane between two classes. In the case of multi-class classifiers, the separation
plane represents the face of a polyhedron whose faces are discriminants to other classes. The
attack assumes the surface that separates two classes is defined by an implicit equation s.t. the
geometrical normal is equal to its gradient vector.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.[120] use the DeepFool attack iteratively for all images in the training
data set in order to find an universal perturbation – one that can be applied to any sample from the
training set. An illustration of universal perturbation can be seen in Figure 2b. Several passes over
the training data set are required in order to improve the quality of the perturbation. At the end of
the procedure, however, the method succeeds in finding image-agnostic perturbations which cause
misclassifications with high confidence.
Althoughmost publications consider adversarial examples in close resemblance to inputs drawn
from the training set, Nguyen et al. [126] craft special images which can not be understood by hu-
man observers, but can generate a targeted classification with high accuracy. The authors leverage
evolutionary algorithms in order to evolve candidate solutions that can fool DNNs. The fitness
function evaluates candidates by sending the image to a target DNN.
Similarly, Su et al. [158] use differential evolution – an evolutionary optimization method that
ensures high population diversity – to generate adversarial perturbations. The output of the final
softmax layer of a DNN is used as a fitness function for the algorithm; for targeted attacks the
fitness function aims to increase the probability of a certain class, while for untargeted attacks
it aims to decrease the probability of the true class. While it requires less information about the
model under attack, this attack performs poorly when compared to gradient-based methods.
The attacks using the optimization strategy are generally precise in finding minimum perturba-
tions or very good approximations of it. Although they are more complex than other types of at-
tacks (because they require more iterations or use different optimization methods), most optimiza-
tion based attacks are still state-of-the-art. From a security standpoint, an interesting approach is
also to generate images that are not intelligible to humans, but can cause misclassifactions. This
phenomenon links to several points in Section 9.
Sensitivity Analysis Attacks. In order to overcome the speed drawbacks of the L-BFGS attack
and following the linearity hypothesis introduced in the previous section, Goodfellow et al. [65]
proposed to sum small perturbations in the direction of the loss gradient taken w.r.t. one input.
Moving a small step in the direction of the gradient results in taking a step towards maximizing
the loss function. Analyzing the gradient of the loss function w.r.t. the input is often referred to
as sensitivity or saliency analysis [182] and reveals the importance of one feature in the decision
process. Formally, the perturbation resulting from this simple attack (called Fast Gradient Sign
(FGS)) is defined as: η = ϵ sign (∇x l(θ ,x ,y)). The value of ϵ controls the size of a perturbation and
impacts the sensitivity of a human observer. Because this attack only requires the computation
of the gradient vector, it is fast to apply and can be used to quickly generate new training data.
However, this method trades precision for speed.
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In order to increase the precision of FGS, Kurakin et al. [98] propose to apply this method it-
eratively and, similar to the gradient clipping procedure, limit the value of a pixel by an upper
bound. Moreover, the authors propose to use this method in a targeted fashion, by maximizing the
likelihood for a chosen class. Madry et al. [115] extend the iterative attack proposed in [98] by it-
eratively applying projected gradient descent (PGD) [17] in order to search for a perturbation that
can approximate the p-norm ball around an input. The use of PGD suggests the approximation is
tractable and a large part of the loss landscape can be explored through it. If such a perturbation
can be found and can approximate the entire p-norm ball, then protecting against it means one
can protect against any perturbation in the norm ball.
Sharp curvatures near a data point can mask the true direction of steepest ascent and burden
the discovery of adversarial examples with single-shot gradient methods [97]. In order to escape
this phenomenon, Tramèr et al.[165] introduce an attack that precedes single-shot attacks with
a randomization step. Randomised Single Step Attack (RSSA) [165] searches for an adversarial
example starting every time from a random vicinity of the input data point, thus avoiding gradient
masking (a phenomenon discussed in Section 7.4).
Dong et al. [39] proposed to boost the iterative version of FGS using gradient momentum. As in
the case of gradient descent, momentum can stabilize the update directions and help escape poor
local minimum/maxima by accumulating a velocity vector in the gradient direction. Setting the
velocity vector to 0 is equivalent to the normal FGS attack.
Papernot et al. [130] introduced an attack based solely on saliency analysis [182]. In order to
discover the importance of each pixel in the decision process, a saliency map is generated by com-
puting the forward derivative (forward Jacobian) of the function learned by a DNN. This method
contrasts with early methods introduced in this section, which use the backward gradient of the
loss function. The forward derivative allows to find better input feature, which ultimately lead to
significant changes in the DNN output. However, its inherent computational costs for big images
limits the impact of this method.
Similarly, Khrulkov and Oseledets [91] used the Jacobianmatrix to construct universal adversar-
ial perturbations exploiting the singular value vectors of the feature maps while Huang et al. [79]
use the Jacobian matrix to compute the linear approximation of a DNN output. The approximation
for the normal and the perturbed case gives the minimal perturbation.
For cases when the gradient can not be well approximated – a phenomena called gradient mask-
ing and presented in Section 7.4 – Athalye et al. [4] introduced an attack which replaces the gradi-
ent of a non-differentiable layer with a differentiable approximation. Thus, the gradient of a DNN
can be approximated by performing the forward pass through the whole network, but on the back-
ward pass each layer is replaced by its approximation. As long as the two functions are similar, the
slightly inaccurate gradients prove useful in constructing adversarial examples.
Chen et al. [29] extrapolate the Carlini and Wagner attack [26] from elastic-net regularization –
a mixture of penalty functions used for high-dimensional feature selection.This algorithm is a
bridge between optimization and sensitivity analysis methods because it uses different minimiza-
tion techniques to discover sensitive features and, thus, adversarial examples.
The attacks based on sensitivity analysis are, generally, faster than the attacks based on the
optimization strategy and can be more easily applied in training models with adversarial examples.
In fact, training with an approximation of the p-norm ball around an input generated with PGD is
one of the state-of-the-art defenses. However, these attacks are often less precise than the attacks
based on the optimization strategy. Evaluating defenses against weak attacks might lead to a false
sense of security, a topic we touch upon in Section 7.4.
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Generative attacks. Until now we introduced attacks that modify a sample from the data gener-
ating distribution by adding an adversarial perturbation. However, data samples might not always
be available. In this section, we cover adversarial attacks based on generative models - a class of
machine learning algorithms that learn to estimate a probability distribution by looking at samples
drawn from it. The model is later used to produce artificial examples belonging to the same distri-
bution. The goal is to generate examples that are similar to training samples, but not exactly the
same. In particular, two generative models are used: (1) Variational Auto-Encoders (VAE) [92, 137]
and (2) Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [64].
Baluja and Fischer [6] trained a DNN that transforms an input into an adversarial example. The
transformation network is trained to fool a target network or to generate examples transferable to
a larger range of networks. The authors use two approaches to generate adversarial examples: (1)
using a residual network to generate a perturbation and (2) using auto-encoders. In practice, using
auto-encoders yields better results and successfully scales to large data sets. The model is efficient
to train, fast to execute, and produces diverse adversarial examples. Moreover, once the network
is trained, the generation of adversarial examples only takes one step, suggesting its efficiency in
adversarial training. However, this approach was not investigated.
Zhao et al. [186] search for adversarial examples in the deep representation of the input data (in-
stead of searching directly in the input space). For this, a generator is trained to map random noise
vectors to samples from the input distribution (from noise to input domain). A second generative
model, called inverter, is trained to map data instances to corresponding dense representations
(from input domain to noise). This is equivalent to finding an adversary in an underlying vector
space which defines the data generation distribution and then map it back to the input space with
the help of a generative model. However, the perturbations obtained through this method are far
from the original inputs and can easily be spotted by human observers.
Poursaeed et al. [135] trained a generative model to generate image dependent and independent
perturbations; leading to specific or universal adversarial examples. However, in the universal case,
the generator’s loss function is a linear combination of the loss functions of the target models,
which makes it heavily dependent on the model under attack. Song et al. [155] used a generative
model, similar to [6] against strong, certified defenses. Their results show that generative models
can easily break defenses focusing on the p-norm ball, even though the defense guarantees no
adversarial perturbation can be found in this region.
Generative models learn to approximate a distribution, from which we can sample new data. In
the case of adversarial examples, generative models learn the distribution of perturbations, assum-
ing that all perturbations are identically distributed. Although this assumption can be restrictive,
even in this setting they are able to find powerful perturbations. However, training generative
models often requires more resources and are rarely used in practical applications of adversarial
examples.
6.1.2 Geometric Aacks. By now we have introduced algorithms that craft perturbations from
noise. In this section, we review some attacks that use more natural, geometric transformations
such as rotation or translation to construct adversarial examples.
Engstrom et al. [45] showed that only simple transformations - rotations and translations - are
sufficient to create adversarial examples. These transformations are easy to craft and realistic in
various operational scenarios. The authors propose several methods ranging from randomly sam-
pling different transformations to grid search or gradient approaches. Depending on the chosen
method, the drop in accuracy ranges from 34 − 90% on models trained with data augmentation
techniques (already including affine transformations).
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ManiFool [89] searches for the smallest, worst-case, geometrical transformation that can fool
DNNs. Similar to the perturbations generated by optimization or sensitivity based methods, these
perturbations are imperceptible to human observers. The main idea behind ManiFool is simply to
iteratively move from an image sample towards the decision boundary where the classification
decision changes, while staying on the geometrical transformation manifold. In particular, the
authors use a combination of rotation, translation and scaling transformations.
Xiao et al. [176] proposed to change the geometry of the scene, while keeping the original
appearance. Instead of imposing norm constraints on the pixel space, the authors introduce a
new regularization loss on the local geometric distortion. The perceptual quality of the adver-
sarial examples remains high, while most defenses fail against this attack. In a similar fashion,
Zhang et al. [184] change the geometry of the scene before applying the Carlini and Wagner at-
tack. In this case, small transformations find inputs that are far away from the training data and lie
in ’blind spots’ which are not covered by defenses. Once perturbed, these inputs lead to powerful
attacks able to fool certified defenses. Although in this case the transformation is not the attack,
it is an important preprocessing step which enables it.
Instead of using one transformation, Athalye et al. [5] search for perturbations over a distribu-
tion of transformations. In the 2D case, the authors use a random distribution of affine transforma-
tions, while in the 3D case they consider textures and shape. This technique is able to synthesize
adversarial examples robust to defenses which use input transformations.
Pei et al. [133] proposed a framework for verifying the robustness of computer vision algorithms
against natural perturbation such as rotation, translation or reflection (but also contrast, brightness
or erosion). These adversarial examples are proved to be strong against state-of-the art classifiers,
making the authors argue they are even stronger than gradient-based attacks. However, more
evidence is needed to test this claim.
Geometrical transformations are thought to occur more frequently in the data acquisition pro-
cess. However, most methods introduced in this section require carefully tuned transformations,
which might limit this claim. Nonetheless, sensitivity to geometric transformations for models
trained with data augmentation techniques shows that algorithms do not learn to abstract general
transformations, but only to fit the training data.
6.2 Black box Aacks
The fact that adversarial examples generated for a model can transfer to others, regardless of
architecture, was first observed by Szegedy et al. [161]. However, this property was only later
explored by Papernot et al. [128] in an attempt to evaluate black-box attacks. The authors examine
how adversarial examples crafted on one model can transfer between several ML techniques such
as linear regression, SVMs or DNNs. In such cases, an attacker has partial or full knowledge of the
training data and can train a substitute model with it.
Later, Papernot et al. [129] developed and evaluated practical black-box attacks against DNNs.
In order to construct adversarial examples for a target model without any information available,
the authors train a substitute model with data generated by the adversary and labeled by querying
the target model. Afterwards, adversarial examples are crafted using attacks based on sensitivity
analysis on the substitute model and transferred to the target model. In order to properly evaluate
their technique, the authors attack various DNNs models hosted online by large companies and
are able to generate misclassifications in most cases.
Liu et al. [109] generate adversarial examples for an ensemble of methods, hypothesizing that
examples that transfer across several substitute models are more likely to transfer across a large
array of black-box models. Their work is also the first attempt to scale black-box attacks on large
data sets. Experimental results show that, in a targeted fashion, the precision of back-box attacks is
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quite low i.e. the adversarial examples do not maintain their intended class. However, if adversarial
examples are used for untargeted black-box attacks, the success rate increases significantly.
Bhagoji et al. [13] present an attack that removes the need to train substitute models. The au-
thors approximate the gradient of a black-box model w.r.t. one input using the finite difference
method and show its success by attacking pre-trained models or cloud deployed ones. Similarly,
Chen et al. [30] present an attack called Zeroth Order optimisation (ZOO), that uses a derivative
free optimization model. This method can estimate the gradient across the perturbation’s direc-
tion taking into consideration the value of the objective function at two neighboring points (cor-
responding to adding or subtracting a small perturbation). The experimental results show ZOO
outperforms black box attacks that artificially train a substitute model [128, 129].
Anothermethod that avoids training a substitute modelswas proposed byNarodytska and Kasiviswanathan [124].
The authors use an iterative search procedure to explore the local neighborhood of a datapoint and
refine the adversarial perturbation. This information provides an approximation of the gradient
of the loss function w.r.t. to the input and, thus, provides valuable information about the sensitive
pixels. Experimental results show good accuracy even for very deep networks. Other publications
use genetic algorithms to synthesize adversarial examples [3] or to estimate the gradients [85]
in order to generate adversarial examples in limited domains (such as limited queries or informa-
tion). Outside image recognition, black-box adversarial examples have been used against malware
detection systems [138].
Black-box attacks rely on estimating the gradient’s direction and using it to generate pertur-
bations. The applicability of substitute models is further discussed in Section 8, where the ability
to transfer adversarial examples between different models is presented. Besides, other estimation
techniques show good performance and have been tested with success in real life scenarios such
as cloud ML service providers.
7 DEFENCES
Similar to the attack evaluation introduced in Section 6, we provide a qualitative and a quantitative
evaluation of each defense. The qualitative evaluation measures the performance of one defense
against various attacks, its complexity and the testing setup, while the quantitative evaluation
measures the literature impact. Each dimensions of both the qualitative and the quantitative as-
sessment is measured on a categorical scale, ranging from low (*), medium(**) and high(***). The
final score is computed by averaging over the attributes described below.
• Defense strength. The defense strength evaluates how powerful a defense is against different
attacks (** or ***, depending on the attack’s strength) or if a defense was broken (*).
• Defense complexity. The defense complexity evaluates how easy it is to apply one defense
(* if the defense is relatively easy to deploy, up to *** if the defense requires changing the
model completely).
• Experimental setup. The experimental setupmeasures how thoroughly the defense was tested;
if a threat model is presented (* if no, ** if the threat model is incomplete and *** if a correct
threat model is presented), against which attacks is the defense tested (*, ** or ***, depend-
ing on the attack strength), and which data sets were used during evaluation (same as for
attacks).
The quantitative evaluation is the same as for attacks: the ratio between the number of citations and
the number of months since publication, as indicated by Google Scholar. Although bibliometrics
are not a direct indicator of quality, they can be a good proxy to influential papers for a novice
reader.
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The results are presented together with the defense strategies discussed in Section 3.2 in Table 2.
We note that the strongest defenses are the certified ones, although they also involve higher com-
plexity.Whenever the perturbation space around a highly dimensional input can bewell estimated,
training with adversarial examples also leads to strong defenses (as in the case of Madry). Unfortu-
nately the least complex defenses – i.e. guards – are also the least powerful. More details follow in
the next sections. We conclude with a discussion the overall efficacy of the defenses (Section 7.3)
and with a note on the evaluation of future defenses (Section 7.4).
7.1 Guards
Guards add a pre-processing step to the classification pipeline, in which adversarial examples are
either detected or their impact is diminished by transforming the input. Because they do not alter
the target model, guards have great potential.
Adversarial detectors are suited for tasks where refusing to process an input or discarding a
classification is not mission critical. For example, an object detector from a cloud storage provider
can refuse to classify one input, but an autonomous vehicle might not be able do so (since the input
can be an important traffic sign). Moreover, based on the constructs used, adversarial detectors can
also suffer from lack of robustness. Input transformations show great potential because they do not
require any training and are easy to deploy. However, they can suffer from the same disadvantage
as adversarial detectors because transforming an input might introduce other side effects. For
example, compressing a high resolution medical image can lead to loss of accuracy.
7.1.1 Detection of Adversarial Examples. Adversarial detectors use a variety of distinct features,
as follows. Grosse et al. [67] used a model agnostic statistical test to check if adversarial exam-
ples are outside the training data distribution. They observe that adversarial examples generated
with some attacks can be found in different regions of the output surface than normal inputs and
can be detected using statistical testing. Gong et al. [62] trained a separate DNN only with ad-
versarial examples, able to successful detect adversarial examples with very small perturbations.
Metzen et al. [117] also trained a DNN for adversarial examples but, this time, the authors use the
output of the DNN’s hidden layers. This techniques shows good result against weak attacks, but
the detector’s performance diminishes agains iterative attacks. Similarly, Li and Li[104] developed
an adversarial detector based on features extracted at every layer of a convolutional neural net-
work. The authors treat an image as a distribution of pixels that can be used to collect statistics
and used statistics from the hidden layers to train an adversarial detector.
Feinman et al. [52] trained a linear detector using two distinct features: (1) the kernel density
estimates in the subspace of the last layer and (2) the bayesian uncertainty estimates extracted from
the drop-out layers [53]. They show that the bayesian uncertainty estimates are typically higher
for adversarial examples, but not enough to successfully detect them. SafetyNet [111] enforces an
attacker to solve a discrete optimization problem. Each activation of a ReLU layer is quantized in
order to generate a discrete code (assumed to be different for adversarial examples and normal
inputs), later used to train an RBF-SVM adversarial detector with high accuracy.
Zhang et al. [185] proposed a new detection mechanism that hides the input labels from the
adversary. This will prevent an attacker from maximizing the loss, given an input and a label and,
thus, from creating an adversarial example. The authors define a one-to-one encoding scheme from
true labels to code vectors. In order to detect adversarial examples, one can verify if the code vector
computed from an input matches the signature of a class with certain precision. If the output is
negative, the input is treated as an adversarial example. This approach shows good results on small
data sets, but was not tested on more complex problems.
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Abbasi and Gagné [1] developed an ensemble of detectors based on the confusion matrix of each
classifier. The underlying idea is that adversarial instances originating from a given class tend to
fall into a small subset of incorrect classes. Therefore, developing an ensemble of detectors which
can distinguish between confusion classes can more easily spot adversarial examples. However,
this claimwas only evaluated on toy networks and data sets. Meng and Chen [116] trained amodel
which distinguishes between a test and training input using the distance between an input and the
data manifold. A thresholding function later decides if an input is normal or adversarial. However,
themethod is based on the existence of a distance function between an input and the datamanifold.
Lee et al. [102] proposed a generative training method in which two DNNs are trained alterna-
tively. The first network generates adversarial examples, while the second tries to correctly classify
benign and adversarial examples. Similarly, Song et al. [154] used generative networks to purify
adversarial examples and search for their true labels. The authors run, at first, a statistical test to
detect if an input belongs to the data generation distribution and, if the test fails, recover the input
using generative models. Ghosh et al. [57] designed a generative model that finds a latent random
variable such that the input and its label become conditionally independent given the latent vari-
able. The latent space is chosen as a mixture of Gaussians, such that each mixture component
represents one of the classes in the data. Inferring the label given the latent encoding is done by
computing the contribution of the mixture components. Adversarial samples are rejected based on
thresholding the encoder and decoder outputs. For example, if the distance between the sample
encoding and the encoding of the predicted class in the latent space is below a threshold.
Although awide range of adversarial detectors have been developed, using very distinct features,
many of them fail to detect strong, adaptive attacks. Moreover, their ability to generalize to new
attacks is limited – as new training is needed for new attacks – thus reducing their applicability.
7.1.2 Input Transformation. Input transformations are thought to restrict the space of adversarial
examples, therefore diminishing their impact. Guo et al. [70] suggest the use of several transfor-
mations: "bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, total variance minimization and image quilt-
ing" [70] as a pre-processing step to a convolutional classifier. The idea of using JPEG compres-
sion was also explored in [35, 42, 148]. Varianceminimization and image quilting prove, in practice,
the most effective transformations. Shaham et al. [148] experiment with other input transforma-
tions: low-pass filters, PCA, low resolution wavelet approximations and soft-thresholding. They
found all transformations provide some robustness against strong white and black box attacks.
Xie et al. [177] propose to use two simple randomization operations: (1) random resizing of in-
put images and (2) random padding with zeros around the input images. However, none of these
approaches provide robustness against strong attacks.
Thermometer one hot encoding [20] breaks the linear behavior of DNNs (suggested with the
linearity hypothesis) by pre-processing the input with an extremely non-linear function. Instead of
replacing a real number with its counterpart transformation, the authors replace each real number
with a binary vector. Multiplying the input vector with the network’s weight enables different
input values to use different parameters of the network. Inspired by thermometer encoding [20],
Rakin et al. [136] proposed to process the input data using an ensemble of methods which includes
the tanh function, batch normalization, thermometer encoding and one hot encoding. When used
in combination with adversarial training, such methods show an increase in robustness because
the resulting DNNs are less linear than normal ones. However, this increase is not powerful enough
to protect against all adversarial examples.
Chen et al. [28] proposed a pre-processing technique that can successfully mask the gradients,
even for iterative attackers. Therefore, without access to the gradients, an attacker can not mount
certain types of attacks. Their proposal is based on encoding thewhole input space using a small set
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of separable codewords and training a classifier on the encoded information. Similarly, Liang et al. [105]
treat perturbations as noise and use noise reduction methods in order to mitigate their threat.
These methods show improvements for small data sets such as MNIST or CIFAR-10, but no im-
provements on larger data sets such as ImageNet.
In general, input transformations lead to stochastic gradients, which make attacks based on
sensitivity analysis harder to mount. However, when tested against attacks using the optimization
strategy, most input transformation defenses fail. We discuss this weakness in Section 7.4.
7.2 Defense by Design
This class of defenses alter the model, the data or the learning procedure in order to increase
robustness. As opposed to guards, where some degree of robustness is achieved earlier in the
processing pipeline, proactive defenses aim to design better architectures or training procedures.
7.2.1 Adversarial Traning. Including adversarial examples in the training data set is a form of reg-
ularization [60] i.e. a strategy designed to reduce the test error, possibly affecting the training error.
Goodfellow et al. [65] found that training with adversarial examples generated with the FGS at-
tack, is an effective regularizer. However, because the attack is not strong, the training procedure
does not increase robustness significantly. Sinha et al. [152] proposed a new training framework
which assumes that simultaneous gradient updates should be statistically indistinguishable from
each other. Thus, the gradient can be regularized in order to remove salient information, which
can lead to adversarial examples. However, this phenomenon leads to masking the gradient and
only protects against sensitivity analysis attacks. Lyu et al. [114] abstracted from these a family of
gradient based perturbations that can be used as regularization techniques. Their work is a gener-
alization of the FGS-based training procedure for all possible norms. Roth et al. [139] proposed a
similar method to regularize the gradients focused on the correlation structure of the perturbations.
However, this method is data dependent and can only be used with certain types of perturbations.
Another way of training with adversarial examples is to completely exclude clean examples
from the training procedure. This method is equivalent to training on the worst inputs possible,
as in eq. (5). Solving the inner maximization problem increases the training time and might not
always be tractable. In practice, however, approximating the result works very well.
Shaham et al. [149] first investigated the min-max training procedure from eq. (5), but found the
inner maximization problem intractable. Therefore, they propose to minimize an alternative form,
in which they only evaluate a single step of the gradient (ascent and descent, corresponding to
the steps in eq. (5)). Trying to solve the same problem, Huang et al. [79] use linear approximation
to approximate the inner maximization problem. Madry et al. [115] use PGD for the inner maxi-
mization problem and suggest the problem is, in fact, tractable. In order to explore a large part of
the loss landscape, PGD is restarted frommany points in the ball around an input. Surprisingly, al-
though there are many local maxima spread widely apart within this space, they tend to have very
well concentrated loss values. This suggests that an adversarial example found by this method is
representative for all adversarial examples generated with first order methods.
Tramèr et al. [165] developed a technique that augments training data with adversarial exam-
ples crafted on other static, pre-trained, models. Training with ensemble methods increases the
diversity of perturbations seen during training. This is equivalent to enhancing the uncertainty
sets with examples crafted on other models. Dhillon et al. [38] define a min-max zero-sum game
between an adversary and a DNN. The strategy for this game is to prune a random subset of ac-
tivations (e.g. those with smaller magnitude) and scale-up the survivors in order to compensate.
This approach is similar to the dropout technique, where the activations with high absolute values
have a higher chance of being sampled.
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 53, No. 3, Article 66. Publication date: June 2020.
Adversarial Examples on Object Recognition: A Comprehensive Survey 66:25
In practice, adversarial training with the worse case perturbation yields very good results. The
Madry [115] training procedure, which approximates the inner maximization problem using PGD
is a state-of-the-art defense. Finding new and faster approximation methods was not explored in
depth and remains an open question.
7.2.2 Architectural Defenses. Some defenses propose to change the model’s architecture by either
imposing layer-wise constraints or by altering the final layer. One of the first proposals uses distil-
lation – a transfer learning method in which smaller DNNs are trained with knowledge extracted
from larger DNNs [77]. Papernot et al. [132] used distillation in order to increase the DNNs ro-
bustness. However, instead of using multiple DNNs in the training process, distillation is used for
a single DNN. As opposed to the original distillation mechanism, the same network architecture
is used both for training and distillation. Cisse et al. [31] introduced a regularization scheme that
constrains the Lipschitz constant layer-wise, thus avoiding any exponential growth of the constant.
In this setting, a regularization scheme (such as weight decay) applied to the last layer controls
the overall Lipschitz constant of the network.
Similarly, Gu and Rigazio [69] proposed a new network architecture, called deep contractive
networks, which imposes a layer-wise constraint. This constraint minimizes the network’s output
variance w.r.t. perturbations in the input s.t. a trained model can achieve robustness for perturba-
tions around training data points. Nayebi and Ganguli [125] developed a new training scheme in-
spired by biophysical principles in neural circuits. Following the idea suggested byGoodfellow et al. [65]
that adversarial examples are due to the linear summing of high dimensional input with small
weights, the authors propose to force neural networks to operate in a non-linear, saturated, regime.
In order to enforce this constraint, the authors ensure that each element of the Jacobian matrix of
the model is sufficiently small s.t. the model becomes insensitive to perturbations.
DeepCloak [55] removes features not used in classification in order to increase robustness to
adversarial examples. To identify unnecessary features, adversarial samples are tested against the
clean example. In order to remove the features, a mask layer is introduced before the logits layer.
The mask serves as a selector, keeping the necessary features and setting the unnecessary to null.
Lamb et al. [99] identify which hidden states are off the data manifold and map these states back
to parts of the data manifold where the network performs better. This process consists of inserting
de-noising auto-encoders at crucial points between layers of the original network in order to clean
up the transformed data points which may lie outside the data manifold. Dumont et al. [40] investi-
gated the resistance to adversarial attacks of three rotation-equivariant network architectures [32].
They discover that rotation equivariant networks are significantly more robust to attacks based on
small translations and rotations, but marginally robust against attacks based on local geometric
distortions.
Sun et al. [159] proposed to use data dependent weights for each hidden layers of DNNs. The
weights are generated using HyperNetworks [71] – a training technique in which a DNN generates
the weights for another. The weights create an inductive bias specific to the training set which
alleviates the effect of adversarial examples for small perturbations. Pontes-Filho and Liwicki [134]
proposed to use bidirectional learning in order to increase robustness to adversarial examples.
Bidirectional learning trains two models – the first on the inputs and the second on a reversed
copy of the inputs. However, in [134], a single model is trained to behave both as a discriminative
and generative model. Therefore, the same model can be a classifier and a generator in the same
time. This behavior is achieved using an un-directed DNN that back-propagates the errors in both
directions – each direction of the network has its own biases and the weights are shared.
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Dense associative models [95] store a set of vectors in memory, corresponding to the learnt
patterns. For example, pixel characteristics (such as intensity) can be stored together with the cor-
responding label. At query time, themodel tries to recover thememory sequences from incomplete
data (corresponding to variations of an input, or perturbations). If strong perturbations are applied
to an input, the model will fail to recover the original label and consider the input adversarial.
Given the linear conjecture, introduced in Section 5, which states that adversarial examples
exploit the linear behavior of DNNs, a normal attempt to increase robustness is to use more non-
linear activation functions. Goodfellow et al. [65] suggested that RBF networks – which behave
in a non-linear manner – are naturally immune to adversarial examples and have low confidence
when they are fooled. However, RBF units can not generalize very well and do not achieve the same
performance as ReLU basedDNNs. Krotov and Hopfield [96] tried to replace ReLU activations with
higher rectified polynomials and observed an increase in robustness. However, the increase is not
sufficient to completely remove the adversarial phenomenon.
Several publications suggested that DNNs capacity increases their robustness to adversarial
examples[98, 115, 140]. However, this correlation was not further investigated .
7.2.3 Certified Defenses. Certified defenses rely on formal verification techniques in order to guar-
antee that robustness holds within the bounds defined in Section 4, for the training data set. Certi-
fied defenses can be broadly classified based on the guarantees they give in (1) exact, deterministic
guarantees – which give a proof of robustness, (2) one-sided guarantees – which find a lower or
an upper bound for robustness, (3) converging lower or upper bound or (4) statistical guarantees,
which quantify the probability that a model is robust [81].
Proving deterministic guarantees for robustness has been formulated as a constrained solving
problemwhere solutions are searched using SMT ormixed integer solvers. Two approaches, namely
Reluplex [90] and Planet [43], use SMT solvers to verify robustness constraints for DNNs with
ReLU activations. Reluplex adapts the Simplex algorithm with rules for non-convex optimiza-
tion in order to handle ReLU function, while Planet uses linear approximation in order to over-
approximate the network’s behavior. If a property is not satisfied, these algorithms return coun-
terexamples, which constitutes valid adversarial examples. Carlini et al. [22] extends Reluplex to
verify p1 and p∞ norm adversarial examples by encoding absolute values using ReLUs. Scaling
SMT/SAT solvers for larger models is, however, difficult and remains an open issue.
Other approaches have focused on certifying lower or upper bounds on the existence of adversar-
ial examples.Wong and Kolter [173] consider a convex outer approximation of the set of activation
values which can be reached using adversarial examples and use linear programming to minimize
the loss in this region. The dual of the linear program can be specified as a DNN, making the
process efficient. Dvijotham et al. [41] propose a similar form in which the dual problem is for-
mulated and solved using a Lagragian relaxation of the optimization problem, thus obtaining an
upper bound on the robustness against adversarial examples. A different method to certify lower
or upper bounds is to encode the inputs in an abstract domain, which contains all perturbations
(e.g. a zonotope), and train with it [56, 118, 181]. Similarly, Gowal et al. [66] use interval bound
propagation for training verifiable robust models. These approaches are very effective and can
scale to larger models.
Huang et al. [82] give proofs of convergence using SMT solvers by exhaustively searching for per-
turbations in a given norm ball, at each layer of DNNs. Later, Wicker et al. [172] andWu et al. [175]
extend the search using Monte-Carlo tree search methods. The publications discussed in Section 4,
however, give statistical guarantees to robustness [9, 142, 171].
Through their ability to guarantee that perturbations within some bounds can not cause misclas-
sifications, certified defenses are well suited for tasks where robustness is paramount. However,
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some techniques (such as using SMT solvers) are very complex, require more training resources
and often do not scale to deep models. Therefore, their applicability is reduced. Moreover, guar-
antees can be given only for the training data set. As discussed in the following section, there are
attacks which can bypass these defenses.
7.3 On the Overall Efficacy of Adversarial Defenses
One limitation of most publications presented in the previous sections is the lack of rigorous eval-
uation. With the exception of defenses that guarantee robustness within some bounds, other pub-
lications do not provide sufficient evidence for their effectiveness. Therefore, the efficacy of these
defenses is often over-emphasized. Fortunately, some publications questioned their success and
showed some defenses are, in fact, not effective.
Carlini and Wagner [24] evaluated the efficacy of adversarial detection methods and proved that
most detectors perform poorly when faced with strong, iterative, attacks. In particular, the authors
use the Carlini and Wagner attack [26] to show that none of the detectors – [12, 52, 62, 67, 76, 104,
117] – efficiently detect adversarial examples and that their reported results do not reflect the real-
ity. Moreover, Athalye et al. [5] broke the [112] detector. In another paper, Carlini and Wagner [25]
show that MagNet [116] is also easily defeated by adaptive attacks.
Conversely, Athalye et al. [4] showed that 7 out of 9 defenses published at ICLR 2018 as non-
certified defenses suffer from gradient masking (a phenomenon described in the next section) and
are not efficient against the BPDA attack (Table 1). Although the other 2 defenses do not suffer
from gradient masking, they have also been broken. He et al. [73] show that combining adversarial
defenses in an ensemble defense is also not effective, while Sharma and Chen [151] broke the
adversary training method based on the Madry attack [115]. Moreover, certified defenses can be
bypassed using generative models [135] or with perturbations outside the pixel norm ball [107].
Zhang et al. [184] showed that robust adversarial training and certified defenses only protect in
regions close to the training data, but fail to protect against inputs away from these regions.
Given these results, the overall efficacy of all adversarial defenses is under scrutiny. A protocol
for defense evaluation is presented in the following section.
7.4 Gradient Masking and Defense Evaluation
Many defenses alleviate the model’s sensitivity to small changes in the input by minimizing the
gradients during the learning phase or constructing models without useful gradients. However,
forbidding access to gradient information is not enough to limit an attacker from constructing
adversarial examples [129]. This phenomenon, called gradient masking [129, 131] was identified
to give a false sense of security and leads to an improper evaluation of adversarial defenses [4,
24, 165]. For example, Galloway et al. [54] found that binarized neural networks exhibit stronger
gradient masking, which sometimes gives them an advantage over full precision models, however,
these methods only provide apparent robustness. Defenses that exploit gradient masking can be
sometimes broken with stronger attacks [21, 24].
Moreover, applying a defense may lead to a false sense of security because current defenses im-
ply an attacker does not know the defense is used. The subject of correctly evaluating adversarial
defenses is at the forefront of research in adversarial examples and has proven to be not trivial [21].
Carlini et al. [21] provide a methodological foundation for evaluating adversarial defenses. Their
suggestions are based on skepticism of the results and evaluation against strong, adaptive, attacks:
the attack models should include the possible defense mechanisms employed. Therefore, the eval-
uation must include the budget an attacker needs to spend in order to break a defense she knows.
At this moment, their work suggest the best protocol for evaluating new defenses and should be
considered whenever a new defense is designed.
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8 TRANSFERABILITY
Besides the existence of adversarial examples, Szegedy et al. [161] showed that adversarial exam-
ples can transfer between differentMLmodels. This phenomenonwas later explored by Papernot et al. [128],
who studied the ability to transfer adversarial examples not only between DNNs, but also be-
tween different ML techniques. The authors identified two types of transferable adversarial ex-
amples: (1) intra-technique examples – which transfer between models trained with the same ML
method and (2) cross-technique examples – which transfer betweenmodels using different methods.
Papernot et al. found that all ML models are vulnerable to intra-technique adversarial examples.
The phenomenon shows stronger for differentiable models than for non-differentiable models. In
regard to cross-technique adversarial examples, linear models, SVMs, decision trees or ensembles
of models are more vulnerable between themselves compared to DNNs, which maintain some
resilience against such techniques. Later, Demontis et al. [36] showed that transferability is depen-
dent on the input gradient’s size (for the target classifier) and on the loss variance for the base
base classifier. Less complex or regularized models, which lead to smaller input gradients, tend to
be more robust.
Liu et al. [109] investigated the transferability phenomenon at larger scale, using the ImageNet
data set and various DNNs architectures. Moreover, the authors discuss transferability in close
relation to the attacker’s goals (Section 3.1): (1) to cause an untargeted or (2) a targeted misclas-
sification. The experimental results show untargeted attacks transfer easily intra-technique. In
contrast, targeted attacks do not maintain labels during transfer. Moreover, when only the hyper-
parameters vary (but the architecture is preserved), transferability is not consistent, revealing that
transferability depends on hyper-parameters. The results are strengthened by Su et al. [157] who
run a large scale study of transferability between different DNN architectures and show that tar-
geted adversarial examples do not transfer between architectures. However, transferability can be
used to reverse engineer models and find the base architecture.
Tramèr et al. [166] show empirical evidence that different models draw similar decision bound-
aries and proposed a method to measure the space where adversarial examples can be found. Fol-
lowing the hypothesis that adversarial examples inhabit large, continuous regions instead of small
pockets of the manifold (Section 5), the authors measure the number of orthogonal perturbations
that can lead to misclassifications. Although these vectors are not sufficient to represent a basis of
the adversarial space, they are a good indicator of its size. Experimental results show this number
depends on the network architecture. Nonetheless, even small adversarial spaces are sufficient to
intersect across different models and give transferable examples. This study also shows that trans-
ferability is inherent to models which learn feature spaces with non-robust properties in the input
space; an idea further developed in [86]. If models were to learn (or designed to select) distinct
features with robust properties in the input space, it would be impossible to transfer adversarial
examples. Therefore, transferability emerges as a consequence of algorithm design.
In summary, the literature brings empirical evidence to show that different ML algorithms learn
a close representation of the input space. Therefore, evading a region corresponding to a correct
class with sufficient distance from the boundaries would most certainly transfer between models.
However, while the representation of classes is similar, they are not distributed alike in the output
space, making it harder to transfer an input in a desired target region.
9 DISCUSSION
The literature on adversarial examples makes different claims about their impact on security and
safety, although in practice all publications use the definition of robustness from Section 4 as a
proxy to either of these notions. In this section we discuss the relevance of robustness to security
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and safety and the economics of building more robust models. Moreover, since p-norm is the dom-
inant similarity metric, we also comment on its relevance. This section ends with a discussion on
the representations learned by DNNs and how they impact adversarial examples.
On the relevance of robustness to security. Gilmer et al. [58] express some skepticism aboutwhether
adversarial examples are always a serious security concern. Here it is interesting to note again that
much of the early work on adversarial machine learning [7, 110] concerned applications of ML for
security tasks, such as detecting spam, malware, or network intrusions. In such applications there
is by definition an attacker interested in causing misclassification, as the whole point of the system
is to defend against such an attacker, and hence misclassifications - esp. false negatives – clearly
have a security impact. By contrast, most recent work on adversarial learning focuses on computer
vision. While adversarial examples may seemworrying thinking of some applications of computer
vision, say automated driving, this does not imply that there is an interesting way for attackers to
exploit it. For example, Eykholt et al. [47] use perturbed stop signs to attack autonomous vehicles.
However, the perturbations are far from sensible and can be detected by human observers. Simply
obscuring or removing the stop sign or may be easier ways to achieve the same effect.
Since adversarial examples rely on small perturbations, which can not be distinguished by hu-
man observers, they seem to be appropriate for attacks on systems which interact with humans
or when the content of the message should not be heavily modified. However, until now there are
not many scenarios in which the lack of robustness defined as in Section 4 has strong security con-
sequences. Searching for attacks which can only be mounted with adversarial examples against
systems that do not carry out security tasks is important to assess their real impact on security.
On the relevance of robustness to safety. From an engineering perspective, safety is the ability
of a system to protect its users from harmful or non-desirable outcomes. The distinction between
security and safety is that security protects a system against intentional, malicious, attacks while
safety protects a system from unintended mishaps in the operational environment. Some publi-
cations aim to improve or validate the safety of DNNs – e.g. [56, 82, 111]. However, safety is an
inherent property of a system and not of an algorithm solely. Moreover, safety becomes important
when a system can produce physical or material damage to humans, assets or the environment.
Talking about safety for systems without such impact – e.g. an image based search engine using
ML – is futile. In order to guarantee safety, one should make sure that possible errors are detected
and contained inside the system without affecting its normal operation. Take again the example of
an autonomous vehicle. If the outcome of its computer vision system is cross checked with infor-
mation coming frommaps, the effect of using adversarial examples on traffic signs can be detected
and contained inside the system, reducing their impact on safety.
The discussion of ML safety in relation to the robustness definition from Section 4 should take
into account the operational environment of an algorithm because some perturbations (such as
those needed to build adversarial examples) may never appear in some environments, but may be
common in others. Besides, it might also be interesting to benchmark an algorithm and increase
its robustness to common corruptions and perturbations [75]. Following this direction may reveal
spots where current algorithms fail although the operational settings are natural and can be more
relevant for safety. Moreover, searching for distance metrics to better reflect the uncertainties in
the operational environment of a system may lead to new threats to safety.
On the relevance of p-norm. The dominant similarity metric in the literature is the p-norm dis-
tance defined in Section 2. Choosing an adequate metric is still an open question. However, since
there are no solutions to robustness for the p-norm distance, it is hard to believe that using other
metrics will result in more robust models [21]. Nonetheless, there is an increased interest to explore
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new distance functions, e.g. the Wasserstein distance [174] or using physical parameters underly-
ing the image formation process [107]. This is an interesting direction to pursue, which may lead
to new attack and defense strategies and new insights about ML algorithms. We argue that the p-
norm remains relevant for experimental settings; however, it must be paired with relevant threat
models in order to evaluate its impact in security and search for operational environments where
it impacts safety. Exploring new metrics and scenarios in which lack of robustness poses threats
to safety or security is an important direction for future research.
On the economics of defending against adversarial examples. Until now there seems to be a trade-
off between accuracy and robustness to adversarial examples, inherent to the algorithms and the
training methods used. Moreover, the results presented in Section 5 suggest that training models
robust to adversarial examples requires more resources than non-robust ones. This means robust-
ness comes at a cost. Whether these cost are acceptable, and how high they can be, will depend on
the application and the context. Given that ML systems are not widely deployed and, as mentioned
earlier, the real impact of adversarial examples on safety and security is still to be determined, it
remains to be seen which defenses can be cost-effective in practice.
On the representations learned by DNNs. The sensitivity of DNNs to adversarial examples raises
questions about their ability to learn high level abstractions from data. Although it is believed that
increasing the depth of a network helps increasing the level of abstraction and it was observed that
early layers in convolutional networks learn filters that resemble contour extractors, while deeper
layers learn more complex patterns, DNNs seem to learn superficial abstractions restricted to the
space on which they operate. In object recognition, the training objectives lie in pixel space, and
not in a conceptual or relational space. Pixel spaces are necessary for extracting first order informa-
tion about the task, but seem to be insufficient for higher level abstractions needed to overcome
complex perception systems. Moreover, the capacity to create adversarial inputs which are not
intelligible by humans (as in [126]) shows that DNNs use different features than we wish for. Re-
search in adversarial examples strengthen the conclusions from Jo and Bengio [88] which analyzed
convolutional networks in different regimes and showed they exhibit a tendency to learn surface
regularities rather than higher-level abstract concepts. Therefore, adversarial examples might be
intrinsic to the methods used to solve ML related tasks or to the current training procedures. In
this context, it is interesting to search for models which learn a better representation of the world
and which may solve the sensitivity to adversarial examples as a side effect.
10 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We focused on several aspects of the adversarial examples phenomenon, in an attempt to provide
a comprehensive and self contained survey of this field of research. In particular, we focused on
explaining the hypotheses on the existence of adversarial examples, position the phenomenon in
the security and robustness context, describe and characterize the attacks and defenses proposed
in the literature and present the ability of adversarial examples to transfer between different ML
techniques. In the appendix we have included examples of software libraries and competitions for
developing attacks and defenses.
To conclude, we note that adversarial examples are an intriguing phenomenon of ML algorithms
and their existence can raise both safety or security alarms. However, their true impact on safety
and securiity is hard to estimate at this moment in time. A key take away is that the phenomenon
of adversarial examples has no generally accepted explanation or solution. Moreover, until now
all defenses (including the ones using formal verification) have been broken. Therefore, the field
remains active and spans several future research directions.
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At first, since no universally accepted conjecture on the existence of adversarial examples exist,
a more fundamental approach is required. Such an inquiry can use methods from topology (to an-
alyze the data manifold or the decision boundaries), from statistics (to extract information about
distribution of adversarial examples) or from learning theory (to investigate in which theoretical
settings the resources needed for training robust models can be decreased). Nonetheless, such an
inquiry must be accompanied by practical reasoning about the impact of adversarial examples on
security by developing, for example, new threat models. Similarly for safety, by searching for oper-
ational scenarios in which the deployment of ML algorithms is hindered by adversarial examples
or searching for scenarios that require new ways to measure and certify robustness.
Secondly, the use of certified defenses suggests robustness within certain bounds can be achieved
(or, at least, precisely measured). It is interesting to search for new certified defenses with small
computational complexity, which can better scale to large models. When designing new certified
defenses it is important to consider how new techniques can help increase the bounds for robust-
ness and not only precisely measure it. Moreover, in ideal settings, new defenses should alter the
models as little as possible and should help already trained models too. Besides, it is important
to search for spaces where certify defenses fail or investigate attacks which can break them. At
the moment, this research is sparse, giving some indications that certified defenses can also be
bypassed [135].
Thirdly, although asymptotic results suggest solving the adversarial examples problem requires
more resources (data or computational), searching for new approximate solutions is essential.
For other tasks, theoretical results suggest similar limits, although approximate solutions already
achieve very good results. Therefore, finding bettermethods to approximate the perturbation space
and train robust models in low data regimes is an interesting research direction.
Lastly, one important take away from analyzing the phenomenon of adversarial examples is that
ML and, in particular, DNNs operate in spaces less abstract than humans do. Therefore, perturba-
tions with no impact in the human space have a large impact in the algorithmic space. We may
compare adversarial examples with human optical illusions, where one is fooled by perceiving
individual stimuli as a whole or illusions that create images different from the objects that make
them (e.g. the rabbit-duck illusion). These subjective stances humans experience, called qualia,
have been long studied in philosophy and psychology and are common in the space of human
cognition or emotion. However, human beings are able to identify when such phenomenons occur
(most humans can identify an optical illusion as an optical illusion, but can not classify its con-
tent correctly). Moreover, the effect of illusions or subjective beliefs can be removed by humans
through rational analysis. This type of analysis has been identified as using the ’slower’ part of
our cognition system, which seems to be missing from the way ML models are currently built. If
limited by time, humans can also be fooled by adversarial examples [44]. However, our capacity
to engage in rational analysis and adapt to the environment removes such threats and remains to
be implemented in machines.
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A TOOLS AND COMPETITIONS
The libraries from Table 3 implement some of the attacks and defenses presented in this paper.
Moreover, there is an increasing number of competitions for developing new attacks and defense,
some of which are mentioned in Table 4.
Name Link
CleverHans https://cleverhans.readthedocs.io
Foolbox https://foolbox.readthedocs.io
Adversarial Toolbox https://adversarial-robustness-toolbox.readthedocs.io/
Advertorch https://github.com/BorealisAI/advertorch
Table 3. List of libraries for aacks and defenses.
Name Link
Unrestricted Adv. Examples https://tinyurl.com/y3xrgoy2
Adv. Vision Challenge https://tinyurl.com/y5hhwomk
CAAD https://tinyurl.com/rrk7e78
Table 4. List of adversarial competitions.
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